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Abstract
We generalize Beladi et al. (2014) for any non-negative, increasing, continuous
function of distance as transportation costs function. By doing so, we show that in a
duopoly, partial privatization does not change the socially optimal character of the Nash
equilibrium location. Our results call for further research on testing their robustness
under the existence of more than two competing rms.
JEL classication: L13; L32; R32
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1 Introduction
Beladi et al. (2014) showed that in a duopoly with spatial price discrimination and linear
transportation costs where one of the rms is partly publicly owned, rmsNash equilibrium
locations are socially optimal. Moreover, they conclude that the degree of privatization does
not a¤ect the equilibrium locations of the rms. In this note, we generalize Beladi et al.
(2014) results for any non-negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function and
we reveal the driving force behind these results.
2 Model and results
Our setting follows that of Braid (2008). We consider a duopoly, with a continuum of
consumers uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1] of a linear city. Three products are
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o¤ered to consumers; J and K from rm D1 and K and L from rm D2. Let the fraction of
consumers buying only good J equal that of those buying only good L equal to c. Product
K is bought by a fraction b of consumers. The above assumptions imply that the two rms
have monopoly power over the goods J and L. Let k denote the maximum reservation price
that the consumers are willing to pay for a good. Evidently, D1 and D2 will charge a uniform
price innitesimally below k for J and L. Spatial price discrimination à la Lerner and Singer
(1937) is assumed regarding product K. The location of D1 and D2 over the interval [0; 1] is
x and y, respectively. D1 is privately owned whereas D2 is partly privately owned and partly
publicly owned in proportions a and 1  a, respectively with a 2 [0; 1]. Transportation costs
are equal to tf(d), where t is a positive constant, d is the distance shipped and f any non-
negative, increasing, continuous function. D1 and D2 simultaneously choose their location
in the market.
The aggregate shipping distance is equal to
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In order to nd the socially optimal Nash equilibrium locations we have to minimize
(1) with respect to x and y. Hence, the socially optimal locations satisfy the rst order
conditions:
@T (x; y)
@x
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2
) = 0 (2)
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Following Braid (2008), the prot functions of D1 and D2 when both rms are privately
owned (i.e. when a = 1) are:
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Therefore, the Nash equilibrium locations when both rms are privately owned is given
by the solution of the following system of equations:
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Following Beladi et al. (2014), when a 2 [0; 1), the prot function of D2 is
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where
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The Nash equilibrium locations under a 2 [0; 1) satisfy (6) and
@^D2(x; y)
@y
= 0 (10)
However, since (9) does not depend on y, @^D2 (x;y)
@y
=
@D2 (x;y)
@y
.
It can be easily noted that the systems of (2) and (3), (6) and (7) and (6) and (10) are
equivalent and therefore have the same solution.
The above analysis leads to the following propositions:
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium locations for a 2 [0; 1] are socially optimal under any
non-negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function.
Proposition 2 The degree of privatization does not a¤ect the socially optimal Nash equilib-
rium locations under any non-negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function.
Proposition 3 The Nash equilibrium locations for a 2 [0; 1) are equal to those for a = 1
under any non-negative, increasing, continuous transportation costs function.
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 apart from proving the results obtained by Braid (2008) and Beladi
et al. (2014) at the same time in complete generality, they establish, most importantly, their
independence from the linear nature of the original model.
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The key observation behind the invariance of the socially optimal Nash equilibrium loca-
tions when rm D2 is partly privatized is that the summand accounting for the welfare in its
prot function, ^D2(x; y), is, in fact, independent of its location y regardless of the degree
of privatization a.
Putting together the above results with the ndings by Cremer et al. (1991), it emerges
that these are duopoly results having nothing to do with the quadratic transportation costs
considered in Cremer et al. (1991).1
3 Conclusion
We show that Beladi et al. (2014) conclusions are robust for any non-negative, increasing,
continuous transportation costs function. Examining the robustness of our ndings under a
two-dimensional spatial framework with more than two competing rms constitutes a topic
for future research.
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